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VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS ARE NO 
VACATION: DETERMINING WHO REALLY 
BENEFITS FROM STUDENT LABOR 
Hilary Weddell* 
Abstract: On April 28, 2011, in Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & School, Inc., 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that students who 
worked as part of the curriculum at a religious-based boarding school were 
not employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act. In so holding, the 
Sixth Circuit expressly endorsed the “primary benefit” test for determin-
ing whether trainees are employees for purposes of the FLSA. The pri-
mary benefit test effectuates the purpose of the FLSA, provides courts with 
the flexibility to prevent employers from exploiting workers, and ulti-
mately benefits employees and students like those at Laurelbrook. Never-
theless, the test does little to clarify Congress’s circular definitions of “em-
ploy” and “employee,” leaving employers and schools like Laurelbrook 
without much guidance. 
Introduction 
 Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, Inc. (“Laurelbrook”) is a reli-
gious-based boarding school for high school students that incorporates 
hands-on training into its curriculum to teach students responsibility 
and respect for manual labor.1 Laurelbrook students split their day be-
tween academic classes and practical work in one of the school’s voca-
tional courses.2 Following an investigation, Hilda Solis, the United 
States Department of Labor Secretary (the “Secretary”), alleged that 
Laurelbrook was violating multiple child labor provisions of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) including regulations on age, child labor 
hours, and hazardous occupations.3 In February 2007, the Secretary 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2011–2012). 
1 See Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc. (Laurelbrook II ), 642 F.3d 518, 520 
(6th Cir. 2011); Brief for the Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc. at 37, Laurelbrook II, 642 
F.3d 518 (No. 09–6128) [hereinafter Brief for Laurelbrook]. 
2 Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc. (Laurelbrook I ), No. 1:07-CV-30, 2009 WL 
2146230, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. July 15, 2009), aff’d, 642 F.3d 518. 
3 See Brief for the Secretary of Labor at 1, 17–19, Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d 518 (No. 09–
6128) [hereinafter Brief for Secretary]. 
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filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee to 
enjoin Laurelbrook from future violations of the FLSA.4 
 Laurelbrook argued that it was categorically exempt from the 
FLSA because it is a vocational school.5 The district court did not adopt 
Laurelbrook’s categorical approach, but nevertheless found that the 
FLSA did not apply.6 The court reasoned that Laurelbrook’s students 
were not employees because the students, not Laurelbrook, were the 
primary beneficiaries of their work.7 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court and expressly en-
dorsed the “primary benefit” test.8 The primary benefit test provides 
the flexibility courts need to evaluate training programs because it al-
lows courts to consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the training program while not requiring strict adherence to specific 
factors.9 Students like those at Laurelbrook may also benefit from the 
primary benefit test because employers may try to provide meaningful 
training with adequate supervision in order to avoid the costly and 
burdensome requirements of the FLSA.10 
I. Laurelbrook’s Vocational Training Program 
 Laurelbrook is a boarding school for ninth through twelfth grade 
students that is run by Seventh-Day Adventists near Dayton, Tennes-
see.11 Laurelbrook aims to provide students with “a balanced program 
of spiritual, academic and vocational training . . . with a goal of repro-
ducing the character of God and preparing for His service.”12 Central 
to this goal, and in addition to four hours of academic classes, Laurel-
                                                                                                                      
4 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 519, 521. 
5 See Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Application for Preliminary Injunc-
tion at 1–2, 8–10, Laurelbrook I, No. 1:07-CV-30, 2009 WL 2146230 [hereinafter Defendant’s 
Memo]. Laurelbrook also argued that its educational and religious values were inter-
woven, and that compliance with the FLSA would compromise the purpose of its voca-
tional program. See Brief for Laurelbrook, supra note 1, at 14–15 (“Laurelbrook (and other 
vocational schools) cannot have a bona fide vocational program if the FLSA regulations 
apply.”); Defendant’s Memo, supra, at 7–8 (arguing that Laurelbrook’s vocational pro-
gram’s purpose would be “seriously compromised” by an injunction). 
6 See Laurelbrook I, 2009 WL 2146230, at *5, *7 (applying a test based on the “totality of 
the circumstances”). 
7 Id. at *7. 
8 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 532. 
9 See id. at 529 (discussing how the primary benefit test’s generality allows it to con-
sider unique situations). 
10 See id. 
11 Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc. (Laurelbrook I ), No. 1:07-CV-30, 2009 
WL 2146230, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. July 15, 2009). 
12 Id. 
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brook students spend four hours per school day learning practical 
skills.13 Laurelbrook offers a range of practical courses in part so that 
students learn the skills necessary to be foreign missionaries.14 
 Students learn specific trades, but also contribute to the mainte-
nance of Laurelbrook’s operation.15 Students help with such tasks as 
landscaping, construction, housekeeping, and boiler room duty.16 Al-
though religious schools need not be accredited, Laurelbrook sought 
and received full accreditation of its vocational program.17 Laurel-
brook’s accreditation allows its students to transfer to other schools in 
Tennessee and still receive credit for some of their work at Laurel-
brook.18 
 In addition to its boarding school, Laurelbrook also runs a nursing 
home, or “Sanitarium.”19 The Seventh-Day Adventist philosophy of ed-
ucation teaches students the importance of learning “how to treat the 
sick and to care for the injured.”20 Therefore, as part of their education 
at Laurelbrook, students work in the kitchen and housekeeping de-
partments of the Sanitarium.21 Some students are also trained as Certi-
fied Nursing Assistants and are allowed to work directly with patients.22 
Yet although the students help run the Sanitarium, the students’ assis-
tance actually impedes its operations.23 The Sanitarium exists solely as a 
vehicle for the school’s vocational program.24 Laurelbrook would have 
                                                                                                                      
13 Id. at *2. 
14 See id. Laurelbrook offers “Agriculture, Building Arts, Grounds [M]anagement, Me-
chanical Arts, Office Procedures, Plant Services, Water Services, Certified Nurses Assistant, 
Child Development, Environmental Services, and Food Service” courses. Id. 
15 Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc. (Laurelbrook II ), 642 F.3d 518, 530 (6th 
Cir. 2011); Laurelbrook I, 2009 WL 2146230, at *3; Brief for Secretary, supra note 3, at 5. 
16 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 530; Laurelbrook I, 2009 WL 2146230, at *3; Brief for Secre-
tary, supra note 3, at 5, 12. Students are also assigned other jobs which contribute to the 
school’s maintenance, including laundry, kitchen duty, garbage collection, logging, elec-
tricity, and farming. Brief for Secretary, supra note 3, at 5, 7, 12. 
17 Brief for Laurelbrook, supra note 1, at 2. 
18 Laurelbrook I, 2009 WL 2146230, at *3. Laurelbrook’s entire curriculum, including its 
vocational program, is accredited through an agency approved by the Tennessee Depart-
ment of Education to accredit member schools. Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 520. Laurelbrook 
sought accreditation because it wanted “to be the best” and give its students transferable 
credits. Brief for Laurelbrook, supra note 1, at 2 (internal quotations omitted). 
19 Laurelbrook I, 2009 WL 2146230, at *2. Laurelbrook received Medicaid funding for 
running the Sanitarium. Id. 
20 Brief for Laurelbrook, supra note 1, at 5 (internal quotations omitted). 
21 Laurelbrook I, 2009 WL 2146230, at *3. 
22 Id. Laurelbrook does not pay the students for their work or guarantee them a job af-
ter graduation. Id. 
23 See Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 530–31; Laurelbrook I, 2009 WL 2146230, at *3. 
24 Laurelbrook I, 2009 WL 2146230, at *3. 
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no purpose in continuing the Sanitarium if not for the vocational pro-
gram.25 
  Laurelbrook’s unique hands-on curriculum prompted “a con-
cerned citizen” to report the school to the Wage and Hour Division 
(WHD) of the U.S. Department of Labor for possible child labor viola-
tions.26 The WHD investigated Laurelbrook and determined that it had 
violated the FLSA for such practices as employing students during 
school hours and allowing them to work in hazardous occupations.27 In 
order to prevent future violations, the Secretary sought injunctive relief 
against Laurelbrook in the district court.28 
 The district court denied the Secretary’s requested injunction, stat-
ing that Laurelbrook students worked for “their own broad educational 
benefit, and thus are not performing work within the meaning of the 
[FLSA].”29 The court found that although Laurelbrook received some 
benefit from the students’ work, it was the students who received the 
primary benefit.30 The Secretary appealed to the Sixth Circuit, claim-
ing that the district court failed to apply the proper test for determin-
ing the applicability of the FLSA.31 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court, however, and expressly endorsed the “primary benefit” 
test.32 
in finding that Laurelbrook students were not “employees” under the 
                                                                                                                     
II. Employee Status Under the FLSA 
 The primary issue on appeal was whether the district court erred 
 
25 Id. 
26 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 519. 
27 Id.; Brief for Secretary, supra note 3, at 17–18. For example, the Secretary alleged 
that Laurelbrook allowed students to drive garbage trucks, use nail guns, and operate cir-
cular saws. Brief for Secretary, supra note 3, at 18. 
28 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 519. According to the Department of Labor, Laurelbrook 
violated the FLSA by employing “oppressive child labor” which includes: (1) any nonagri-
cultural employment under the age of sixteen for more than three hours per school day 
and eighteen hours per week while school is in session; or (2) employment of children 
under the age of eighteen in any occupation that the secretary declares particularly haz-
ardous for children. See Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 521–22; Brief for Secretary, supra note 3, 
at 17–19, 25–27. 
29 Laurelbrook I, 2009 WL 2146230, at *7. 
30 See id. 
31 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 521. 
32 Id. at 525–26, 532. The Sixth Circuit relied on Walling v. Portland Terminal Co. where 
the Supreme Court held that when a training program mainly benefits the trainees, rather 
than the alleged employer, the trainees should not be deemed “employees” for FLSA pur-
poses. See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 153 (1947); Laurelbrook II, 642 
F.3d at 525–26. 
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FLSA.33 The FLSA opaquely defines an “employee” as “any individual 
employed by an employer,” and “employ” as including “to suffer or 
permit to work.”34 Although the FLSA’s definitions are remarkably 
broad, the Supreme Court has limited the definition of “employ” to 
exclude those who work for their own benefit, such as in a training or 
educational program.35 The Court in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co. 
reasoned that Congress did not intend to outlaw relationships where 
individuals forgo payment for the opportunity to learn valuable skills 
which cannot be taught in a classroom.36 Instead, one of the purposes 
of the FLSA was to prevent employers from manipulating children into 
working for free and displacing regular entry-level workers.37 The FLSA 
is also meant to protect children’s educational opportunities by pre-
venting them from working during school hours.38 
 Courts apply various tests to determine whether a student is an 
“employee” under the FLSA.39 Despite the various tests, it has long 
been held that the FLSA standard is based on the circumstances sur-
rounding the alleged employment activities, not on the labels affixed 
by the parties.40 Courts do not look at whether an employer calls its 
workers “employees,” “volunteers,” or “trainees.”41 Instead, courts de-
                                                                                                                      
33 Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc. (Laurelbrook II ), 642 F.3d 518, 521 (6th 
Cir. 2011). 
34 Id. at 522 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), (g)(2006)). 
35 See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152–53 (1947) (stating that Con-
gress did not intend to outlaw relationships of individuals “who, without promise or expec-
tation of compensation, but solely for his personal purpose or pleasure, worked in activi-
ties carried on by others persons either for their pleasure or profit”). 
36 See id. 
37 See Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 527; McLaughlin v. McGee Bros. Co., 681 F. Supp. 1117, 
1132, 1134–35 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (finding the FLSA “clearly” applied because the minors 
were “manifestly being exploited” by the defendants to do adult work), aff’d sub nom. Brock 
v. Wendell’s Wookwork, Inc., 867 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1989). 
38 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wages and Hours Worked: Child Labor Protections (Nonagricul-
tural Work), (Sept. 2009), http://www.dol.gov/compliance/guide/childlbr.htm. 
39 See Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying 
the WHD’s six-part test, but disagreeing that all six factors must be met for “employee” 
status); McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that “the general 
test used to determine if an employee is entitled to the protections of the [FLSA] is 
whether the employee or the employer is the primary beneficiary of the trainees’ labor”); 
Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 701 F.2d 1124, 1127–28 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying the WHD’s 
six-part test, but primarily focusing on the “primary benefit” factor); Donovan v. Am. Air-
lines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 273 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying the WHD’s six-part test). 
40 See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729–30 (1947); Laurelbrook II, 
642 F.3d at 524; see also Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 528 (1950) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting); Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1116 (6th Cir. 1984). 
41 See Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 524. 
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termine whether the FLSA applies by looking at the quality of the train-
ing and the benefits the alleged employees receive from the work.42 
A. Determining Employee Status: Categorically Exempt or a Six-Part Test? 
 Laurelbrook argued that it was categorically exempt from the 
FLSA because it is a legitimate vocational school.43 According to Lau-
relbrook, the Supreme Court in Walling v. Portland Terminal “made [it] 
clear that the FLSA does not apply to vocational schools . . . .”44 In Port-
land Terminal, the Court held that prospective brakemen in a railroad 
training program were not employees under the FLSA.45 The Court 
explained that “[h]ad these trainees taken courses . . . in a public or 
private vocational school, . . . it could not reasonably be suggested that 
they were employees of the school within the meaning of the Act.”46 
The Court further explained that if the term employee applied to eve-
ryone who “work[ed] for their own advantage on the premises of an-
other[,] . . . all students would be employees of the school or college 
they attended, and as such entitled to receive minimum wages.”47 
 The Sixth Circuit disposed of Laurelbrook’s categorical approach 
because it bypassed any real consideration of the economic realities of 
the alleged employment relationship.48 The court rejected Laurel-
brook’s reliance on language from Portland Terminal referencing voca-
tional schools because the Court in that case was evaluating an em-
ployer-based training program, not a vocational school.49 Therefore, 
the language from Portland Terminal on which Laurelbrook relied was 
mere dicta.50 The Sixth Circuit also noted that other courts have found 
vocational students to be “employees” governed by the FLSA, and 
therefore other courts have not categorically excluded vocational 
schools from FLSA coverage.51 
                                                                                                                      
 
42 See id. at 526, 529; Marshall v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 465, 477 (M.D. Tenn. 
1979), rev’d on other grounds, 668 F.2d 234, 236 (6th Cir. 1981). 
43 Brief for Laurelbrook, supra note 1, at 14. 
44 Id. 
45 330 U.S. at 149, 153. 
46 Id. at 152–53.  
47 Id. at 152. 
48 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 523–24. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. (agreeing with the court in Marshall that the language in Portland Terminal was 
meant to “point out the absurdity of regarding as employment a student’s regular school 
work performed primarily for its educational value”) (internal quotations omitted). 
51 See id. at 524; see also Reich v. Shiloh True Light Church of Christ, 895 F. Supp. 799, 819 
(W.D.N.C. 1995) (finding children in church’s vocational program were employees under 
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 Alternatively, the Secretary urged the Sixth Circuit to apply the 
Wage and Hour Division’s (WHD) six-part test to determine whether 
students in training programs were employees under the FLSA.52 In an 
attempt to guide employers, the WHD designed its test based on the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Portland Terminal.53 Under the WHD 
test, vocational students or trainees are not employees under the FLSA 
if: (1) “[t]he training, even though it includes actual operation of the 
facilities of the employer, is similar to [the work] given in a vocational 
school;” (2) the training is done for trainee’s benefit; (3) the trainees 
work under close supervision and do not displace regular employees; 
(4) “[t]he employer [providing] the training derives no immediate ad-
vantage from the activities of the trainees,” and occasionally the train-
ing may actually impede the employer’s operations; (5) “[t]he trainees 
are not necessarily entitled to a job at the completion of the training 
period; and” (6) both parties “understand that the trainees are not en-
titled to wages for the time spent in training.”54 Under the WHD test, 
all six criteria must be satisfied.55 The Secretary argued that the WHD 
test should apply in this case because the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Skidmore v. Swift requires that administrative interpretations be entitled 
to deference.56 
 The Sixth Circuit rejected the WHD test because it was inconsis-
tent with the flexible standard articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb.57 The Rutherford Court expressly stated 
that determining an employment relationship should not depend on 
                                                                                                                      
the FLSA), aff’d per curiam, 85 F.3d 616 (4th Cir. 1996); Marshall, 473 F. Supp. at 467, 477 
(finding college students who were hospital trainees to be employees under the FLSA). 
52 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 524; Brief for Secretary, supra note 3, at 28–31. 
53 See Letter from Barbara R. Relerford, Office of Enforcement Policy, Wage and Hour 
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, (May 17, 2004), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/ 
FLSANA/2004/2004_05_17_05FLSA_NA_internship.pdf. 
54 Id. 
55 See id. 
56 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 525; Brief for Secretary, supra note 3, at 31; see Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (determining that the “opinions of the Administrator 
under this Act, while not controlling . . . do constitute a body of experience and informed 
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance”); see also Fed. Ex-
press Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008) (finding that an “agency’s policy state-
ments, embodied in its compliance manual and internal directives,” deserve some respect). 
Courts differ in the extent to which they apply the WHD test. Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 525. 
Some courts strictly apply the WHD test, while others have rejected it completely. See, e.g., id.; 
Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d at 1026–27 (finding the WHD test relevant, but not dispositive); 
Ensley, 877 F.2d at 1209 & n.2 (rejecting the WHD test completely); Atkins, 701 F.2d at 1128 
(stating the WHD test is entitled to “substantial dereference”). 
57 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 525; see Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730. 
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“isolated factors” but on “the circumstances of the whole activity.”58 A 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach looks at the entire training pro-
gram to determine whether the educational value derived by the train-
ees is worth the loss of protections of the FLSA.59 No one factor is de-
terminative, and each program may be evaluated differently.60 The 
Sixth Circuit described the WHD test as “overly rigid and inconsistent 
with a totality-of-the-circumstances approach,” and therefore concluded 
that any deference to which the test was entitled was diminished.61 
B. Focusing on the Primary Beneficiary 
 Rather than adopting one of the parties’ approaches, the district 
court focused on who received the primary benefit of the students’ 
work.62 The court’s use of the “primary benefit” test aligns with deci-
sions in the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits.63 Courts in those circuits 
have all favored a test that weighs the benefits that the trainee and 
trainer received from the free labor.64 
 The Sixth Circuit agreed that the primary benefit test was appro-
priate because the Supreme Court made a similar primary benefit in-
quiry in Portland Terminal.65 In Portland Terminal, a railroad company 
required prospective brakemen to complete the company’s unpaid 
training course before being eligible for hire.66 Since the training was 
mandatory, the brakemen claimed that the labor made them employ-
ees under the FLSA, therefore entitling them to payment.67 The Su-
preme Court disagreed because the brakemen gained valuable skills, 
while the railroad did not receive any “immediate advantage” from 
their work.68 The court considered several factors, such as the adequacy 
                                                                                                                      
58 331 U.S. at 730. 
59 See id.; Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 525, 529 (applying the primary benefit test because 
the WHD test failed to consider the totality of the circumstances). 
60 See Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730; Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 525. 
61 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 525; see Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730. 
62 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 525–26. 
63 See Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2005); Ensley, 877 F.2d at 1209 & n.2; 
Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d at 272. 
64 See Blair, 420 F.3d at 829; Ensley, 877 F.2d at 1209 & n.2 (stating that the proper legal 
question is which party receives the primary benefit, and expressly declining to follow the 
WHD’s six-part test); Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d at 272 (focusing on which party receives 
the “greater benefit”). 
65 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 526. 
66 330 U.S. at 149–50. 
67 See id. at 149. 
68 Id. at 152–53 (internal quotations omitted). 
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of supervision, whether the brakemen displaced regular employees, 
and whether the brakemen’s work expedited the company’s business.69 
 The Sixth Circuit determined that the flexibility of the primary 
benefit test adequately protected against the evils the FLSA was meant 
to target, including the displacement of regular employees and exploi-
tation of labor.70 To determine who received the primary benefit, the 
Sixth Circuit recognized that some of the WHD factors might be help-
ful.71 Therefore, although the court rejected the rigidity of requiring all 
WHD factors, it did not reject the use of WHD factors to help guide the 
primary benefit inquiry.72 For example, whether trainees derive any 
educational benefit from the program and whether the program hin-
ders the alleged employer’s operations may help the court determine 
whether trainees are working for their own benefit or whether the em-
ployer is simply seeking free labor.73 
 Applying the primary benefit test to Laurelbrook, the Sixth Circuit 
acknowledged that Laurelbrook received some benefit from its stu-
dents’ free labor.74 Laurelbrook benefitted from students’ contribution 
to the maintenance of the school, and the school received payment for 
some of the services performed by the students.75 For example, Lau-
relbrook students helped sell flowers and produce, and Laurelbrook 
retained the proceeds.76 Laurelbrook also received Medicaid funding 
for providing services to patients at the Sanitarium where Laurelbrook 
students worked for free.77 The court weighed these benefits against 
the costs Laurelbrook incurred in providing students with hands-on 
training.78 For example, the court noted that Laurelbrook’s operations 
were actually hindered by the students’ work.79 Without the burden of 
training students, Laurelbrook’s employees could complete more work 
in less time.80 Therefore, although Laurelbrook received some benefit 
                                                                                                                      
69 See id. at 149–50. 
70 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 527, 529. 
71 Id. at 525, 529. 
72 Id. 
73 See id. at 529. 
74 See id. at 530. 
75 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 530. 
76 Id. 
77 See id. at 520, 530. 
78 See id. at 530–31. 
79 Id. 
80 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 531. The Sanitarium staff would have been able to provide 
the same services without student help. Id. 
80 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice Vol. 32: E. Supp. 
from the students’ free labor, the benefit was offset by the disruption to 
Laurelbrook’s operations.81 
 The Sixth Circuit determined that Laurelbrook’s students were the 
primary beneficiaries of their labor.82 The free labor Laurelbook re-
ceived did not outweigh the significant tangible and intangible benefits 
the program provided to students.83 Laurelbrook’s curriculum gave 
students hands-on training that enabled them to be especially competi-
tive in the workplace.84 Laurelbrook gave students meaningful work, 
and teachers adequately supervised them.85 The court also heavily em-
phasized the intangible benefits Laurelbrook students received from “a 
well-rounded education . . . in an environment consistent with their 
beliefs.”86 Laurelbrook’s students learned about responsibility and the 
dignity of manual labor, had a strong work ethic, and often took on 
more leadership roles both in and outside the classroom.87 The Sixth 
Circuit decided that these intangible benefits tipped the primary bene-
fit scale in the students’ favor.88 
III. The “Primary Benefit” Test 
 The parties’ rigid approaches were not aligned with the flexible, 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach called for by the Supreme Court 
in Rutherford.89 Laurelbrook’s asserted categorical exemption of all voca-
tional schools from the FLSA ignored the need to assess the economic 
realities of its training program.90 Similarly, the Secretary’s proposed use 
of the WHD test was inadequate because it inflexibly required satisfac-
tion of all six of the test’s factors.91 In contrast, the primary benefit test 
does not require specific factors, but allows courts to consider all factors 
that are relevant.92 The primary benefit test gives employers some guid-
                                                                                                                      
81 Id. at 530–31. 
82 Id. at 532. 
83 Id. at 531–32. 
84 See id. at 531. 




89 Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc. (Laurelbrook II ), 642 F.3d 518, 523–25 
(6th Cir. 2011); see Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947) (stating 
that an employment relationship should be determined by “the circumstances of the 
whole activity,” not “isolated factors”). 
90 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 523–24. 
91 See id. at 525, 529. 
92 See id. at 529. 
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ance as to what courts will consider when determining employee status, 
but it does not impose a precise formula on courts.93 
 The “primary benefit” test effectuates the purpose of the FLSA by 
allowing courts to discern and eliminate the types of harmful child la-
bor Congress sought to prevent.94 When a court discerns that an em-
ployer is the primary beneficiary of a child’s labor, this may signal to 
the court that the employer is taking advantage of the child.95 Con-
versely, where the work primarily benefits the children, and either hin-
ders or insignificantly benefits the employer, it is unlikely that the em-
ployer is using children simply to avoid paying adult employees.96 
Focusing on the primary beneficiary allows courts the flexibility to 
identify employers who abuse children for commercial gain and hold 
such employers accountable under the FLSA.97 
 Despite its advantages, however, the primary benefit test is prob-
lematic for employers and schools like Laurelbrook because it creates 
uncertainty about who is an employee under the FLSA.98 To avoid vio-
lating the FLSA, employers and schools like Laurelbrook must attempt 
to discern the primary beneficiary of student or trainee work without 
any specific checklist of factors.99 The primary benefit test, although 
flexible for courts, requires a balancing of benefits that may be difficult 
for employers to preemptively appraise.100 Parties may not know that 
they are in violation of the FLSA until after a court’s ruling.101 These 
                                                                                                                      
93 See id. (discussing how the primary benefit test focuses on generalities); Gerard P. 
Panaro, The HR Troubleshooter: Unpaid Internships and the FLSA, 17 No. 5 HR Advisor: Le-
gal & Practical Guidance Art. 6, 54, 59 (2011) (discussing the dangerous uncertainties 
that a generalized approach would put on intern versus employee determinations). 
94 See Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 529. For example, in enacting the FLSA, Congress 
sought to prevent situations in which adults must compete with children for jobs. Id.; 
McLaughlin v. McGee Bros. Co., 681 F. Supp. 1117, 1132, 1134–35 (W.D.N.C. 1988), aff’d 
sub nom. Brock v. Wendell’s Wookwork, Inc., 867 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1989). 
95 See Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 529; McLaughlin, 681 F. Supp. at 1132, 1134–35 (dis-
cussing how the FLSA was meant to prevent the shameless exploitation of children). 
96 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 529. 
97 See id.; McLaughlin, 681 F. Supp. at 1134–35. 
98 See Panaro, supra note 93, at 59 (stating that a totality-of-the-circumstances approach 
makes the “employee” determination more “uncertain, risky, dangerous and complicated” 
because employers do not know what factors will be evaluated). 
99 See id. 
100 Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 525; Panaro, supra note 93, at 59. 
101 See Panaro, supra note 93, at 54, 59; David C. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of 
Student Interns, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 215, 233 (2002) (arguing that inconsistent results are 
almost guaranteed when the trier of fact must engage in an extensive, subjective analysis). 
As there is no bright line test, courts may exercise broad discretion when determining 
which party is the primary beneficiary. See Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 522–23, 529; Yamada, 
supra, at 233. 
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mistakes may be costly for employers.102 Yet although it is imperfect, 
the primary benefit test ultimately benefits students and trainees be-
cause it incentivizes potential employers to improve their training pro-
grams in order to avoid FLSA regulat
Conclusion 
 The primary benefit test provides courts with the flexibility to pro-
tect against the evils the FLSA meant to target, including the displace-
ment of regular employees and the exploitation of labor. Nevertheless, 
Congress must address the FLSA’s circular definitions of “employ” and 
“employee.” Until Congress clarifies these definitions, courts will con-
tinually grapple with how to determine who is an “employee” for FLSA 
purposes. Court-by-court variation in determining who is protected by 
the FLSA ultimately creates uncertainty for employers and vocational 
schools like Laurelbrook. 
 
102 See Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 529 (discussing the “costly and burdensome require-
ments” of the FLSA); Panaro, supra note 93, at 54, 59 (mentioning the costly consequences 
of misjudging the applicability of the FLSA); see also Brief for Laurelbrook, supra note 1, at 
14 (asserting that Laurelbrook’s training program could not exist if FLSA regulations ap-
plied). 
103 See Laurelbrook II, 642 F.3d at 529; Panaro, supra note 93, at 59. 
